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¤ Ãëàâíàÿ ¤ Êíèæíàÿ âûñòàâêà ¤Ãîñòèíàÿ ¤ ×èòàëüíûé çàë ¤ Gloria Mundi ¤ Íàøè äðóçüÿ ¤ Ãîñòåâàÿ ¤ Êàðòà ñàéòà ¤
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Devil’s faces:
In my report I shall deal
with some features of devil’s image which might be regarded as at least
unnatural. But can one say with good reason that devil is really supernatural?
While discussing the problem of supernatural in medieval culture one introduces
an idea which, in its modern understanding, is alien to this culture.
Medieval scholars used a
term «supernaturalis», but its meaning differed from what we now understand as «supernatural». For us «supernatural» means
something opposite to nature, something that lays outside the nature’s borders.
For medieval thinkers, on the contrary, «supernaturalis» is closely connected
with nature: «supernaturalis» is, so to speak, absolutely natural continuation
of nature — or, otherwise, «natural» is quite natural continuation of
«supernaturalis». In any case, natural and supernatural are not opposed to each
other, but rather complete each other. As John Scot Erigena said (in his
commentaries to «Celestial Hierarchy»), «God, who is supernatural, comes before
nature» («Deus, qui supernaturalis est, praecedit naturam»)
[2]
.
Nature is realized as continuation of
«supernatural»: nature follows supernatural, their relation can be described as
a mutual complement, not as an opposition or contradiction.
Describing the situation in
terms of semiotics, one can say that nature provides signs for supernatural,
or, according to famous statement of Hugh of Saint-Victor, «everything in
nature talks of God» («omnis natura Deum loquitur»)
[3]
.
From this viewpoint natural and supernatural are two levels of one and the same
language: natural functions as its sign, supernatural functions as its
signified.
One more distinction can be
drawn between modern and medieval understanding of supernatural. For modern man
supernatural doesn’t allow any rational explanation; for medieval man, quite
the contrary, supernatural is incorporated into heavenly plan, it has clear and
understandable purposes and functions. As Peter Lombard says, «What are
miracles for, if not for fear of God?» («Sed quid prosunt miracula, nisi ut
timeretur Deus?»)
[4]
.
Thus, to think within the
opposition of natural and supernatural means to oversimplify a picture which in
fact is much more complicated. In medieval imagination the supernatural is
incorporated into vertical scheme: normal reality can be compared to a certain
surface which lays in the middle of a vertical axe, supernatural lays above this surface — not beyond it, as for modern man. But there
is one more level, that lays beneath normal reality: I mean all phenomena that belong to demonic sphere. For want of
a better term I shall call this level «under-natural». The system of these
three levels is characterized by increase of order from the bottom upwards: supernatural
is distinguished by perfect order, — undernatural, on the contrary, is marked
by almost complete loss of any order. Devil, according to Augustine, «doesn’t
stay in tranquillity of order» («in ordinis tranquillitate non mansit»)
[5]
;
he is not only alien to the order of universe, but he also tries to destroy
this order. As Fulgentius said, devil «fled from undisturbable tranquillity and
now is in service of disturbance» (illam imperturbabilem requiem fugerat,
deinceps perturbationi serviret)
[6]
.
Alienation from the order of
the universe is the main characteristics of devil which differs him from a man.
But in what way this alienation is expressed in visual imagery? One can found
this expression in a «disorder» of devil’s body, that combines different parts
of man, animals, insects; moreover, parts of his body are very often connected
in a strange, unnatural way. For example, his face can be placed on his belly
or elbows; his horns — on his knees, his wings — on his legs, and so on.
Inner and outer parts of his
body may be inverted, as in example from «Vita Mariae Oigniacensis» by Jacques
de Vitry mentioned by Nancy Caciola: the demon appears before exorcist «“as if
with his bowels vomited out” and carrying “all his interior parts” on his
shoulders as punishment»
[7]
.
All these visual
distortions, however different they may seem, have a single theological
meaning: as a kind of visual metaphors they express the idea of devil
ontological disoder, of his alienation from the order of universe. If human’s
body is «well-ordered» being a mirror of divine order of universe, devil’s body
is «out of order»: almost all parts of
his body are, so to speak, «out of joint», they are, as it were, involved in
restless, irregular, unpredictable movement. It is not by chance that devil’s
face is often placed on knees or elbows — that is, on the most unstable, most
mobile parts of human body.
Thus, devil’s body as
presented in a lot of medieval pictures is a result of a number of operations
whose purpose is to transform a certain natural order — order of a body. This
is a point where I am coming to a comparison with classical rhetoric, since the
aim of rhetoric — creation of «embellished speech» (narratio ornata) — also
assumes the transformation of initial natural order of speech (narratio
simplex, plana). The operations used to transform «natural» visual image into
«unnatural» figure of devil are very similar to operations used to transform «natural», «simple» speech
into embellished one (I mean rhetorical figures and tropes). This likeness
allows us to speak about visual figures and tropes — for example, about visual
metaphors.
Let us consider the case of
metaphor as a kind of rhetorical trope. Quintilian and Cicero define metaphor
as a transference of a word from its proper place («ex
eo loco in quo proprium est»
[8]
) to the «alien» one («in alieno loco»
[9]
).
We see something very similar in devil’s
body when his face is transferred from its natural, proper place to improper
one — for example, to belly or elbow. By this operation of visual metaphor the
natural order of body is transformed into unnatural — or rather
«under-natural».
Therefore, visual image of
devil can be compared to a highly metaphorical speech. If one compares man’s image with
a plain, unembellished «visual speech» (let us call it
«imago plana»), then devil’s image may be regarded as a kind of embellished,
though in some parodic way, «visual speech» (let us call it «imago ornata»).
Now I would like to dwell
upon one specific «rhetorical» device applied to visual image: I mean the
device of reduplication — namely, above mentioned reduplication of faces.
Unlike characters of supernatural world (angels or God) devil often has several
faces. This device of reduplication of visual element corresponds to a number
of rhetorical figures which are connected with reiteration of a certain verbal
element (reduplicatio, gradatio, geminatio and so on).
In medieval imagery
supernatural creatures never possess several faces. Only demonical characters,
«under-natural» as it were, are distinguished by such a peculiarity. In what
way this peculiarity is determined by inner qualities of devil, by his specific
«nature»?
Devil’s «multifaceness» is
just a visual expression of multiplicity inherent to his nature. «My name is
Legion, for we are many», — this famous sentence was understood by church
farthers as devil’s confession concerning his own nature. Multiplicity
manifests itself in different aspects of demonic existence. For example, devil
has «thousand names», he knows «thousand ways of doing harm» — according to the
Vergil’s line which holy fathers adopted as a characteristic of devil: «tibi
nomina mille, mille nocendi artes»
[10]
.
Of course, this multiplicity
visually manifests itself in different ways, including above mentioned «multifacenes».
Devil in his appearances often splits, as it were, into several figures. Before
Saint Illarion he emerged as a number of fighting gladiators
[11]
; in the cell of Saint Abraam he intruded «as a
great crowd (quasi turba plurima)»
[12]
;
in gallic «Life of Saint Roman» devil presented himself «in the form of two
girls (sub duarum puellarum forma)»
[13]
.
What does this multiplicity
mean as a characteristic feature of devil? We have to remember that for
medieval man devil, as a representative of «under-natural», occupies the lowest
place in a «Great Chain of Being». According to this view, devil’s multiplicity
was never regarded as a certain
advantage — but, on the contrary, it was estimated as a deficiency. It’s not by
chance that from all parts of devil’s body exactly the face was chosen as the
most frequent object of multiplication — that is, the most unique part of the
body, most closely associated with individuality.
In fact, devil lacks
individuality: his multiplicity doesn’t signify ability «to possess many
individualities», but otherwise, — it signifies his inability «to be one and
the same». Devil is not able to exist as unity; his illusive existence is a constant disintegration, constant
splitting into unstable varieties of «faces». To put it shortly, devil cannot possess face — he can possess
only faces.
This idea has found perfect
expression in above-mentioned gallic «Life of Saint Roman». When devil had
appeared to monk Sabinian in a form of two girls, monk «recognized one beast
under the double face (unum nosset sub specie gemina monstrum)» and said to
devil with reprove: «Why do you always appear before me in various forms? Don’t you feel shame since you always
see me one and the same (unum ac solum), and never see me in another shape?».
Sabinian opposes his own
permanence to devil’s mutability. This mutability seems to be a kind of
deficiency: devil lacks the simple ability that any human being possesses — the
ability to exist in one and the same shape, to possess one and the same face.
Devil’s «multifaceness» can
be regarded not only as an intrinsic quality of his nature, but also as a part
of devil’s «military strategy» — as a device in his struggle against humanity. At that point the question of
visuality has to be raised again, since the struggle between man and devil took
place in the visual domain: visuality is, as it were, a «military territory»,
where man meets his enemy.
In this visual war man and
devil use different tactics. Man tries to hold the devil constantly in visual
field, since to see means to obtain control: someone who beholds devil thereby
gets control on him — and, therefore,
gets a victory. Thus, Saint Anthony was accredited with following words about
himself: «I have seen all devil’s traps drawn on the earth»
[14]
.
According to a statement of a certain desert father, «blessed is a man who
always sees his sins» («Beatus est qui peccatum suum semper videt»)
[15]
.
Ideal state is described as constant visual control on devil: in this state man
always «has the devil before his eyes» — «ante oculos enim habemus adversarium
nostrum», as Saint Syncletica puts it
[16]
.
Indeed, holy man, saint is
very often endowed with ability to see the devil when for an ordinary man he
remains invisible. Thus,
The capacity of sight — I
mean inner, spiritual sight, «oculus mentis» — is a kind of weapon in a man’s
struggle against devil. Therefore, devil, on his side, tries to escape this
visual control by deceiving a man with
false images (phantasma, simulacra, visiones etc.).
In medieval imagery, to
cheat man with fallacious illusions means to make him «blind». At this point I
have to introduce a very important opposition of vision and blindness. Saint or
righteous man is characterized by unlimited capacity of vision: thus, according
to Gregory the Great, for righteous men in paradise «there would be nothing in
nature that they could not see» («nihil in creatura agitur quod videre non
possint»)
[18]
.
Unlike holy man, devil is characterized as spiritually «blind». Origen was,
probably, the first Christian thinker who had connected evil with blindness:
devil is at the same time «evil» (poneros) and «blind» (tuflos)
[19]
. What is supposed here is not a physical
blindness but rather devil’s inability to participate in constant, endless and
absolute mutual vision that unites God, angels and righteous men.
The fall of devil is
described metaphorically as eclipse, obscuration, a loss of sight. «Where devil
had exalted against God, there he was abandoned by God and became blind», said
Augustin («ubi contra Deum exaltatur, ibi ab illo deseritur, et in se
tenebratur»)
[20]
.
Devil, the main «blind», who
lost forever any access to vision of God, tries to make a man «blind» as well.
As Peter Chrysologus said, devil «taught explorers of the world to see nothing»
(speculatores mundi docuit nihil videre)
[21]
.
Conversion to devil is described metaphorically as making blind: devil «can
blind the hearts of those who begin to serve him» («diabolus... potest ...
obcaecare corda eorum qui conarentur servire ei»), as Iraeneus said
[22]
.
Taking into account the
connection between the ideas of devil’s deceive and blindness inflicted by
devil one may come to a paradoxical conclusion: man who beholds images produced
by devil actually sees nothing. «To see» in this case means «to be blind». Such
is the main antinomy of visual relation between man and devil.
But what really happens when
a man encounters a demonic vision? From psychological viewpoint he just sees
something deceiving, or, as Lactantius puts it, demons «cheat men’s eyes with
blinding delusions» («visus hominum praestigiis obcaecantibus fallunt»)
[23]
.
From viewpoint of visual
rhetoric the situation can be interpreted in another way. The devil presents
before a man certain visual metaphors — a kind of riddles that man either can
or cannot to solve.
Jesus Christ acts very much
in the same way, when he displays his own fleshly image as a kind of metaphor
or riddle, which devil failed to solve. Hiding his divinity in flesh as in the
visual riddle and therefore using flesh as visual metaphor of divinity, Jesus
Christ, according to Saint Ambrose,
committed «a pious fraud» (pia fraus)»
[24]
.
The widespread comparison of flesh with a veil (velamen, integumentum) that
hides divinity of Christ
[25]
cannot but remind of medieval poetological concept of «integumentum» as a false
story that hides truth: «A lot of truthful things are hidden under a fallacious
tegument» («plurima sub falso tegmine vera latent»), said Theodulfus of Orlean
[26]
.
Being the matter of visual
rhetoric, the struggle between man and devil takes the form of metaphorical
exchange: man and devil acts as exegetes, trying to interpret the visual
riddles presented to each other. Devil’s tactics in the moment of this visual
encounter is quite simple: devil tries to persuade a man that all fantastical
visions he produces are true, that visual image and truth are the same things.
Appearing to
«Believe, when you see» —
this devil’s words express the very essence of his visual tactics. Using the
terms of visual rhetoric one can describe the situation in the following way:
devil is convincing a man that demonic visions are not metaphors, that they
correspond to reality and therefore have
«literal meaning». To win the devil means to realize that all his visions are
nothing but metaphors of devil’s wickedness.
At the conclusion of my
report I would like to quote a text which helps to clarify my point. Sulpicius
Severus wrote about
This text describes the
relations between the saint and the devil as visual. It is important that the
text is permeated with the reminiscences from classical rhetoric. Sulpicius
opposes devil’s «propria substantia» to his «figura»: devil can transfer
(transferro) himself from «propria substantia» to «figura nequitiae». What
Sulpicius describes here is absolutely analogous to rhetorical transformation
of simple, unembellished speech into embellished one: «verbum proprium» (the term
which corresponds to Sulpicius’ «propria substantia») when transferred
(transferro — a term appropriated by Sulpicius) into improper place becomes a
«figura» (this term also used by Sulpicius). The expression «subiectum oculis» perhaps also has rhetorical
origin: it sounds like Quintilian’s definition of hypotyposis (or, in latin terminology,
demonstratio) — a figure of «submitting to eyes» («sub oculis subiectio»
[29]
):
speaker, describing a given event in details, forces a listener to see it by
inner sight. Suplicius takes from classical definition the idea of moral force:
speaker is able to compel a listener not only to hear, but also to see — in the
same way a saint is able by force of his faith to compel devil to appear before
his eyes. To sum up, we can say with a good reason that Sulpicius borrowed from
rhetoric a set of terms and applied them in the domain of visual imagery.
We come to a conclusion that
devil’s multiple faces were regarded as visual metaphors, as, so to speak,
«figures of visual speech». Literal understanding of these metaphors leads a
man to failure in his struggle with devil. A man has to overcome this
multiplicity of devil’s metaphorical images, he has to realize them as
teguments of devil’s proper face, his «propria substantia». We can find very
exact formulation of this idea in «Apology» of Priscillian: «For whatever
shapes, forms, or names the devil changes himself into, we know that he can be
nothing else but the devil... whether he is regarded as a beast... or a serpent
or a dragon, we know that he is the devil»
[30]
.
This proper face of devil in
terrestrial world is hidden; very few elected, such as
[1]
Supernatural
[2]
Joannes Scotus Erigena.
Expositiones super Ierarchiam caelestem S. Dionysii. Cap. X. PL. 122, cl. 228.
[3]
Hugo de S. Victore. Eruditio
didascalica. Lib. VI, cap. 5. PL. 176, cl. 805.
[4]
Petrus Lombardus. Commentaria in
Psalmos. Psalmus CX. PL. 191, cl. 1009.
[5]
Augustinus. De civitate Dei. Lib.
XIX. Cap. XIII. PL. 41, cl. 641.
[6]
Fulgentius. Ad Monimum.Lib. I. Cap.
XVII. PL. 65, cl. 165.
[7]
Caciola N. Discerning Spirits.
Divine and Demonic Possession in the Middle Ages. Cornell UniversityPress,
2003. P. 44.
[8]
Quintilian. Institutio oratoria.
8:6:5.
[9]
[10]
Aen. 7:336.
See: Deproost P. A. Mille nocendi artes. Les prefigurations virgiliennes du mal dans
la poesie des chretiens latin // Imaginaires de mal.
Ed. par M. Watthee-Delmotte et P.-A. Deproost. P., 2000. P. 55-68.
[11]
Hieronymus. Vita S. Hilarionis
eremitae. 7. PL. 23, cl. 32.
[12]
Vita sancti Abrahae eremitae XVI.
// Vitae patrum. PL. 73. cl. 290-291.
[13]
Vita Sancti Romani // Vie des peres
du Jura. P., 1968. P. 298, 300.
[14]
Antonii Magni Sententiarum expositio. PG. 40á, cl. 1089.
[15]
Verba seniorum. PL. 73, cl. 968.
[16]
Verba seniorum. PL. 73, cl. 896.
[17]
Sulpicius Severus. Epistula 3. 15-17 //
Sulpice Severe. Vie de Saint Martin.
[18]
[19]
Origen. Contra Celsum. I, 61 //
Origene. Contre Celse. (Sources Chretiennes 132).
[20]
Augustinus.Contra adversarium legis
et prophetarum. Lib. 1, cap. XV. PL. 42, cl. 615.
[21]
Petrus Chrysologus. Sermo XCVI. PL.
52, cl. 470.
[22]
Irenee de Lyon. Contre les
heresies. V, 24, 3. P., 1969. (Source chretiennes. Vol. 153). P. 302, 304.
[23]
Lactantius. Divinae institutiones.
Lib. II, Cap. 15. PL. 6, cl. 332.
[24]
Ambrosius Mediolanensis. Expositio
Evangelii secundum Lucam. Lib IV. 16. PL. 15, cl. 1617.
[25]
For example, Gregorius Nazianzenus.
Oratio XI. In sanctum baptisma. X. PG. 36, cl. 370-371; Leo Magnus. Sermo LXIX.
Cap. IV. PL. 54, cl. 378 («carnis velamine Deus... tegebatur»). This image goes
back to apostle Paul (Ad Hebraeos, 10:20).
[26]
Theodulfus Aurelianensis. De libris
quos legere solebam // PL. 105, cl. 331.
[27]
Sulpice Severe. Vie de Saint
Martin. T. 1. P., 1967. P. 306 (24:6).
[28]
Sulpice Severe. Vie de Saint
Martin. T. 1. P., 1967. P. 298 (21:1).
[29]
Quintilianus. Institutio Oratoria.
9:2:40.
[30]
Priscillian. Apology. 17.29-18.9.
Quoted in: Burrus V. The Making of a Heretic. Gender, Authority, and the
Priscillianist Controversy.
[31]
Gregorius Magnus. Moralia. Lib.
XXXIII, cap.
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¤ Ãëàâíàÿ ¤ Êíèæíàÿ âûñòàâêà ¤Ãîñòèíàÿ ¤ ×èòàëüíûé çàë ¤ Gloria Mundi ¤ Íàøè äðóçüÿ ¤ Ãîñòåâàÿ ¤ Êàðòà ñàéòà ¤
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